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CLONING MIRANDA: WHY MEDICAL MIRANDA 
SUPPORTS THE PRE-ASSERTION OF CRIMINAL 
MIRANDA RIGHTS 
COLIN MILLER* 
 Courts across the country have concluded that suspects cannot assert 
their Miranda rights before being subjected to custodial interrogation. This 
reluctance to credit pre-assertions can be traced to dicta from McNeil v. 
Wisconsin, in which the Supreme Court noted that “[m]ost rights must be 
asserted when the government seeks to take the action they protect against.” 
This Article challenges this notion by drawing an analogy between criminal 
suspects and patients. In 1990, Congress passed the Patient  
Self-Determination Act (“PSDA”), the so-called “medical Miranda,” which 
requires health care providers who accept money from Medicaid or 
Medicare to inform patients of their rights regarding advance directives and 
the refusal of medical treatment prior to admission. 
 The goal of the PSDA is to inform patients of their health care rights 
prior to admission so that they can assert those rights before being pressed 
into an unfamiliar environment in which they face possible isolation and 
coercion. This Article contends that the same principles that led to the 
passage of the PSDA support the ability of suspects to be able to pre-assert 
their Miranda rights when custodial interrogation is “imminent.” It also sets 
up a framework for determining whether a suspect properly pre-asserted his 
Miranda rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Demetrius Wilson was a suspect in the fatal shooting of Reginald 
Knox, and Detective Brian Krueger “put out word” that he wanted to 
interview Wilson.1 Wilson’s stepfather contacted Krueger and arranged 
for Wilson to come to the police station with relatives for an interview.2 
While being interviewed at the police station, Wilson made a first 
statement in which he claimed he shot Knox because Knox was robbing 
him at gunpoint.3 Police officers then accompanied Wilson and his 
 
 1. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 175, 177 (Ky. 2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
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relatives to the crime scene, where Wilson walked them through his 
version of events.4 The officers (1) responded that his story was not 
consistent with the evidence; and (2) lied to him by telling him that 
video cameras recorded the shooting.5 The officers suggested that 
Wilson and his relatives talk things over at lunch and return to the 
police station in the afternoon.6 
Upon returning to the police station, Wilson’s stepfather told 
Detective Krueger that the family consulted with a lawyer, who told 
Wilson not to speak to police.7 Wilson then told a police officer “that if 
the police wished to speak with him, they should contact his attorney.”8 
Upon these words leaving Wilson’s lips, he was immediately arrested 
and taken to an interview room.9 There, Wilson was read his Miranda 
rights, said he understood them, and gave an incriminatory statement 
that was inconsistent with his first statement.10 
The court denied Wilson’s motion to suppress his second 
statement, and he was eventually convicted of murder.11 Wilson 
appealed, claiming he validly invoked his Miranda rights prior to 
giving his second statement, meaning the statement was inadmissible 
under the Miranda right to counsel.12 The Supreme Court of Kentucky 
agreed that the second statement would be inadmissible if Wilson 
properly invoked his Miranda rights;13 however, the court concluded 
that Wilson’s Miranda right to counsel had not yet attached because his 
request for an attorney was made before he was subjected to custodial 
interrogation.14 As support, the court cited the following dicta from the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in McNeil v. Wisconsin15: 
We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his 
Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than 
“custodial interrogation” . . . . Most rights must be asserted 
when the government seeks to take the action they protect 
against. The fact that we have allowed the Miranda right to 
counsel, once asserted, to be effective with respect to future 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 176. 
 12. Id. at 178. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. 501 U.S. 171 (1991). 
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custodial interrogation does not necessarily mean that we will 
allow it to be asserted initially outside the context of custodial 
interrogation, with similar future effect.16 
The court thereafter laid out a laundry list of other court opinions 
from around the country, each of which also cited this dicta from 
McNeil to conclude that a suspect cannot invoke Miranda “rights unless 
he or she is subject to custodial interrogation.”17 
The thesis of this Article is that, contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, suspects should be able to pre-assert their Miranda rights. 
This Article advances this thesis by reference to the Patient  
Self-Determination Act (“PSDA”), the so-called “medical Miranda,” 
which requires all health care providers who accept money from 
Medicaid or Medicare to inform patients of their rights regarding 
advance directives and the refusal of medical treatment prior to 
admission in health care facilities. Specifically, this Article contends 
that the same policy goals that allow and even encourage patients to  
pre-assert their medical Miranda rights militate in favor of recognizing 
pre-assertion of criminal Miranda rights. Moreover, this Article argues 
that courts should determine whether custodial interrogation is 
“imminent” and thus conducive to pre-assertion of Miranda rights by 
applying the same “totality of the circumstances” test they use to decide 
whether police officers can pre-administer the Miranda warning. 
Section I looks at the Miranda opinion and the subsequent 
Supreme Court opinions expanding and narrowing its scope. Section II 
analyzes the PSDA and the reasons why Congress thought it made 
sense to inform patients of the ability to execute advance directives 
before being admitted into health care facilities. Finally, Section III 
argues that the same principles that led to the passage of the PSDA 
support the ability of suspects to be able to pre-assert their Miranda 
rights when custodial interrogation is “imminent.” The Article 
concludes by setting up a framework for determining whether a suspect 
properly pre-asserted his Miranda rights. 
I. MIRANDA AND ITS PROGENY 
A. Miranda and Fifth Amendment Rights 
The Supreme Court’s 1966 opinion in Miranda v. Arizona18 
resolved four consolidated cases.19 In all four cases, police officers 
 
 16. Wilson, 199 S.W.3d at 178–79 (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n.3). 
 17. Id. at 179. 
 18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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interrogated suspects without first informing them of their right to 
remain silent and their right to counsel.20 The four suspects each 
claimed that their interrogations violated the Fifth Amendment’s 
requirement that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself . . . .”21 
The Supreme Court agreed, concluding that “the prosecution may 
not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from 
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against  
self-incrimination.”22 The Court then defined “custodial interrogation” 
as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has 
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action 
in any significant way.”23 According to the Court, before subjecting a 
suspect to such custodial interrogation, law enforcement officers must 
adhere to the following procedural safeguard or its functional 
equivalent: “the person must be warned that he has a right to remain 
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against 
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either 
retained or appointed.”24 
In response to this Miranda warning, the suspect can voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently waive these rights.25 If, however, the 
suspect indicates that he wishes to speak with an attorney, the 
interrogation cannot proceed.26 Moreover, if the suspect is alone and 
invokes his right to remain silent by stating that he does not wish to be 
interrogated, the officers cannot question him.27 
B. Michigan v. Mosley and the Right to Remain Silent 
Nine years later, in 1975, the Supreme Court was confronted with 
the question of whether law enforcement officers can re-administer the 
Miranda warning and interrogate a suspect who has already invoked his 
 
 19. Id. at 491–98. 
 20. See id. One of these suspects, Ernesto Miranda, was charged with 
kidnapping, rape, and armed robbery. Two police officers put Miranda in an 
interrogation room and emerged with a written confession two hours later without any 
indication they had informed him of his constitutional rights. See id. at 491–92. 
 21. Id. at 442, 491. 
 22. Id. at 444. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 444–45. 
 27. Id. at 445. 
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right to remain silent. In Michigan v. Mosley,28 Detective James Cowie 
arrested Richard Mosley in connection with a string of robberies and 
read him the Miranda warning.29 After Cowie began interrogating him, 
Mosley stated that he did not want to answer any questions about the 
robberies.30 Cowie ceased questioning Mosley and took him to the cell 
block.31 
Over two hours later, a different detective took Mosley to the 
Homicide Bureau and read him the Miranda warning.32 Mosley 
indicated that he understood the warning, and the detective proceeded 
to question him about a murder.33 After first denying his involvement, 
Mosley incriminated himself in the homicide.34 Upon being charged 
with first-degree murder, Mosley moved to suppress his confession, but 
the trial court denied the motion.35 Following his ensuing conviction, 
Mosley appealed, claiming that the admission of his confession violated 
the Miranda doctrine.36 
The Supreme Court noted “that the admissibility of statements 
obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent 
depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ 
was ‘scrupulously honored.’”37 Applying this standard, the Court 
concluded that Mosley’s right to cut off questioning was, in fact 
scrupulously honored.38 According to the Court, after Mosley initially 
asserted his right to remain silent, “the police here immediately ceased 
the interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a 
significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings, 
and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a 
subject of the earlier interrogation.”39 
 
 28. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). 
 29. Id. at 97.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 97–98. 
 33. Id. at 98. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 98–99. 
 36. Id. at 99. 
 37. Id. at 104 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 479 (1966)). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 106. Many courts have referred to these four factors as the Mosley 
factors. See, e.g., State v. Hartwig, 366 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Wis. 1985). These factors, 
however, are not to be “woodenly applied,” and none of them alone is dispositive on 
the issue of whether a suspect’s right to remain silent was scrupulously honored. Id.; 
see, e.g., Grant v. Warden, Maine State Prison, 616 F.3d 72, 77 (1st Cir. 2010).  
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C. Edwards v. Arizona and the Edwards Prophylaxis 
Another six years later, the Supreme Court was confronted with a 
similar question: can law enforcement officers re-administer the 
Miranda warning and interrogate a suspect who has already invoked his 
Miranda right to counsel? This time, however, the result was very 
different. In Edwards v. Arizona,40 Robert Edwards was charged with 
robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder.41 During custodial 
interrogation and after being read the Miranda warning, Edwards 
expressed interest in making a deal, prompting the interrogating officer 
to give him the county attorney’s phone number.42 Edwards dialed the 
number before quickly hanging up and saying, “I want an attorney 
before making a deal.”43 The officer responded by taking Edwards to 
the county jail.44 
The next morning, a guard informed Edwards that two detectives 
wished to speak to him, prompting Edwards to respond that he did not 
want to talk with anyone.45 The guard responded that Edwards had to 
talk to the detectives.46 Edwards thereafter met with the detectives, who 
read him the Miranda warning and played him the taped statement of an 
alleged accomplice who had implicated him.47 Edwards then agreed to 
speak and incriminated himself.48 Edwards moved to suppress his 
confession, but the trial court denied the motion, concluding that his 
statement was voluntary.49 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding “that when 
an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during 
custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be 
established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated 
custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.”50 The 
Court further found that a suspect who has “expressed his desire to deal 
with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to 
 
 40. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
 41. Id. at 478. 
 42. Id. at 478–79. 
 43. Id. at 479. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 479–80. 
 50. Id. at 484. 
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him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, 
exchanges, or conversations with the police.”51 
The Supreme Court has subsequently referred to this holding as 
the “Edwards prophylaxis” because it is a judicially crafted,  
non-constitutional rule rather than one that is constitutionally required.52 
In other words, this prophylaxis is merely a “rule established to protect 
the Fifth Amendment based Miranda right to . . . counsel” and not part 
of the Miranda right itself.53 Under this prophylaxis, the defendant’s 
subsequent waiver of his right to counsel is presumed to be involuntary 
and the result of the inherently compelling pressures of custodial 
interrogation.54 Because this presumption is merely a prophylaxis, 
either the Supreme Court or a lower court can decide to expand it to 
different factual contexts.55 That said, because the Edwards rule is 
prophylactic, a court can extend it to cover additional situations only 
after balancing benefits against costs and determining whether the 
extension serves its prophylactic purpose.56 
D. Pre-Assertion of Miranda Rights 
1. MCNEIL V. WISCONSIN AND THE DICTA ON PRE-ASSERTION 
A decade later, in McNeil v. Wisconsin, the defendant asked the 
Supreme Court to extend the Edwards prophylaxis. In McNeil, Paul 
McNeil was arrested on suspicion of armed robbery.57 When two 
Milwaukee County deputy sheriffs read McNeil the Miranda warning 
and sought to interrogate him, he refused to answer any questions but 
did not ask for an attorney.58 At his initial appearance/bail hearing, 
McNeil requested and was appointed a public defender.59 After his bail 
hearing, McNeil was incarcerated, and Detective Joseph Butts visited 
him on three occasions over the next four days to talk about a murder, 
 
 51. Id. at 484–85. 
 52. See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 116 (2010) (citing the 
“Edwards prophylaxis”). 
 53. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 787 (2009). 
 54. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 115–16. 
 55. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 780 P.2d 844, 850 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) 
(“Stewart requests this court to extend the Edwards prophylactic rule in order to shield 
his custodial confession that occurred following the invocation of his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel at an arraignment on an unrelated charge.”). 
 56. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 106–09. 
 57. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 173 (1991). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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an attempted murder, and an armed burglary in Caledonia.60 Each time, 
Butts read McNeil the Miranda warning, and, each time, McNeil 
signed a Miranda waiver.61 During Butts’ third visit, McNeil made an 
incriminatory statement while Butts interrogated him.62 
The next day, McNeil was charged with the Caledonia crimes.63 
He moved to suppress his confession, but the trial court denied the 
motion.64 After being convicted, McNeil appealed, claiming that his 
courtroom appearance with counsel constituted invocation of his 
Miranda right to counsel.65 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by considering the right to 
counsel contained in the Sixth Amendment, which states in relevant part 
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”66 The 
Court noted that this Sixth Amendment right to counsel is  
offense-specific and only attaches when a prosecution is commenced via 
a “formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignment.”67 Therefore, McNeil’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
had only attached in connection with the armed robbery and had not yet 
attached in connection with the Caledonia crimes.68 
McNeil, however, claimed that his invocation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in connection with the armed robbery 
charge also constituted “an invocation of the non-offense-specific 
Miranda–Edwards right.”69 The Court agreed that the Miranda right to 
counsel “is not offense specific: Once a suspect invokes the Miranda 
right to counsel for interrogation regarding one offense, he may not be 
reapproached regarding any offense unless counsel is present.”70 The 
Court, however, disagreed with the argument that invocation of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel implies invocation of the 
Miranda/Fifth Amendment right to counsel; instead, it concluded that 
“[o]ne might be quite willing to speak to the police without counsel 
present concerning many matters, but not the matter under 
prosecution.”71 Moreover, the Court admonished that invocation of the 
 
 60. Id. at 173–74. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 174. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 175 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). 
 67. Id. (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984)).  
 68. Id. at 176. 
 69. Id. at 177. 
 70. Id. (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 (1988)). 
 71. Id. at 178. 
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Miranda right to counsel “requires, at a minimum, some statement that 
can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the 
assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the 
police. Requesting the assistance of an attorney at a bail hearing does 
not bear that construction.”72 
McNeil nonetheless contended that the Court should still find 
attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel implied invocation 
of the Miranda right to counsel as a matter of sound policy.73 In other 
words, McNeil asked the Court to extend the Edwards prophylaxis.74 
The Court refused, finding that “if we were to adopt petitioner’s rule, 
most persons in pretrial custody for serious offenses would be 
unapproachable by police officers suspecting them of involvement in 
other crimes, even though they have never expressed any unwillingness 
to be questioned.”75 
After rejecting this argument, the McNeil majority addressed the 
dissent in a footnote that was partially quoted in the introduction to this 
Article: 
The dissent predicts that the result in this case will routinely 
be circumvented when, “[i]n future preliminary hearings, 
competent counsel . . . make sure that they, or their clients, 
make a statement on the record” invoking the Miranda right 
to counsel. We have in fact never held that a person can 
invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other 
than “custodial interrogation”—which a preliminary hearing 
will not always, or even usually, involve. If the Miranda right 
to counsel can be invoked at a preliminary hearing, it could 
be argued, there is no logical reason why it could not be 
invoked by a letter prior to arrest, or indeed even prior to 
identification as a suspect. Most rights must be asserted when 
the government seeks to take the action they protect against. 
The fact that we have allowed the Miranda right to counsel, 
once asserted, to be effective with respect to future custodial 
interrogation does not necessarily mean that we will allow it 
to be asserted initially outside the context of custodial 
interrogation, with similar future effect. Assuming, however, 
that an assertion at arraignment would be effective, and would 
be routinely made, the mere fact that adherence to the 
principle of our decisions will not have substantial 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 180. 
 74. Id. at 181. 
 75. Id. at 181–82.  
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consequences is no reason to abandon that principle. It would 
remain intolerable that a person in custody who had expressed 
no objection to being questioned would be unapproachable.76 
2. MCNEIL’S AFTERMATH AND THE ADOPTION OF THE 
PRE-ASSERTION DICTA 
In the aftermath of McNeil, courts across the country correctly 
concluded that this footnote was dicta.77 In McNeil, the Court 
determined that McNeil did not make any statement during his bail 
hearing that could “reasonably be construed to be an expression of a 
desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial 
interrogation by the police.”78 Therefore, the McNeil majority’s 
speculation about whether a suspect can assert his Miranda rights 
anticipatorily and in a context other than custodial interrogation was 
unnecessary to its opinion.79 
That said, while courts have construed this footnote as dicta, they 
have also categorically applied it to invalidate pre-assertions of Miranda 
rights. For instance, in State v. Relford,80 police officers believed that 
Charles Relford committed a homicide and interrogated him after 
reading him the Miranda warning.81 At the end of this interrogation, the 
officers arrested Relford and transported him to jail.82 The following 
day, a sergeant told Relford about telephone restrictions at the jail and 
asked him if he wanted to speak to a lawyer.83 Relford answered that 
“he needed the public defender.”84 The sergeant responded that “a 
public defender would have to be appointed to him by the Court, 
however, if he wanted to call them, there was the phone, and I would 
provide the phone number for him.”85 Relford did not follow up on his 
request, but the police did follow up with Relford the next day, 
securing his confession after reading him the Miranda warning.86 
 
 76. Id. at 182 n.3 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 184 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 77. See, e.g., Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1246 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 78. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178. 
 79. Redman, 34 F.3d at 1246 (“[T]his passage in McNeil is essentially dicta, 
being a response to a hypothetical posed by the dissent . . . .”). 
 80. 623 N.W.2d 343, 344 (Neb. Ct. App. 2001). 
 81. Id. at 344–45. 
 82. Id. at 344. 
 83. Id. at 345. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 344–45. 
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Relford was later charged with murder and moved to suppress his 
confession.87 The district court agreed with Relford, finding that his 
statement that “he needed the public defender” was an unequivocal and 
unambiguous invocation of his Miranda right to counsel.88 But the 
Court of Appeals of Nebraska reversed, citing the aforementioned 
footnote from McNeil.89 
The Nebraska court was not alone in citing McNeil; it noted that 
“[m]any state courts which have considered the issue have relied on the 
language in McNeil v. Wisconsin, to hold that one cannot anticipatorily 
invoke the Miranda right to counsel prior to custodial interrogation.”90 
Moreover, “relying on McNeil v. Wisconsin, an overwhelming number 
of federal courts have also held that a defendant cannot invoke his 
Miranda rights outside the context of custodial interrogation.”91 
While McNeil only involved the alleged assertion of the Miranda 
right to counsel, courts have also used it to defeat claims by suspects 
that they asserted their right to remain silent prior to custodial 
interrogation. For example, in Barnett v. State,92 Dustin Barnett 
voluntarily went to the police station where Detective Curtis Lampert 
took him to an interrogation room before telling him that he did not 
have to talk with police and that he was free to leave.93 Barnett 
responded that he wanted to leave and did not want to talk.94 Detective 
Lampert responded by leaving the room, returning a few minutes later, 
and telling Barnett that he was no longer free to leave.95 Lampert later 
read Barnett the Miranda warning and interrogated him, resulting in 
Barnett making a number of incriminatory statements.96 
After he was charged with first-degree murder with a deadly 
weapon and robbery with a deadly weapon, Barnett unsuccessfully 
moved to suppress his statements and was convicted.97 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Nevada cited McNeil for the proposition that 
Miranda rights cannot be asserted anticipatorily.98 Therefore, the court 
found no constitutional violation because “Barnett’s initial invocation of 
 
 87. Id. at 345. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 346, 349 (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 
(1991)). 
 90. Id. at 347 (citation omitted) (collecting cases). 
 91. Id. at 348 (citation omitted) (collecting cases). 
 92. No. 61083, 2013 WL 7155560 (Nev. Dec. 18, 2013). 
 93. Id. at *1.  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991)).  
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his right to remain silent occurred before Miranda circumstances even 
existed.”99 
II. THE PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT 
A. Cruzan and the Right to Refuse Unwanted Medical Treatment 
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,100 Nancy 
Cruzan was rendered incompetent and dependent on life support as the 
result of an automobile accident.101 Thereafter, her parents and 
coguardians moved for “a court order directing the withdrawal of their 
daughter’s artificial feeding and hydration equipment after it became 
apparent that she had virtually no chance of recovering her cognitive 
faculties.”102 The Supreme Court of Missouri denied their request, 
concluding that they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that Cruzan would have wanted life support withdrawn under the 
present circumstances.103 
In addressing this issue on appeal in June 1990, the United States 
Supreme Court concluded that “the common-law doctrine of informed 
consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent 
individual to refuse medical treatment.”104 The Court was able to infer 
this “constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted 
medical treatment” by considering both the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause and prior precedent regarding the right to bodily 
integrity.105 That said, the Court found no problem with Missouri 
enacting a procedural safeguard that surrogates seeking to withdraw life 
support must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
incompetent patient would have made the same decision.106 
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor wrote separately to 
emphasize a few points not addressed by the majority’s opinion. One of 
these points was that the problem confronted by the Court could be 
avoided in the future based upon advance directives.107 Specifically, she 
noted that decisions such as the one before the Court “might be avoided 
if the State considered an equally probative source of evidence: the 
 
 99. Id. at *2. 
 100. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 101. Id. at 265.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 277. 
 105. Id. at 278. 
 106. Id. at 281–82. 
 107. Id. at 289–90 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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patient’s appointment of a proxy to make health care decisions on her 
behalf.”108 She also presciently pointed out that “[d]elegating the 
authority to make medical decisions to a family member or friend is 
becoming a common method of planning for the future.”109 
Justice O’Connor observed that some states had started to allow 
agents appointed via durable power of attorney to make health care 
decisions while others “allow an individual to designate a proxy to 
carry out the intent of a living will.”110 Assessing these developments, 
Justice O’Connor concluded that “[t]hese procedures for surrogate 
decisionmaking, which appear to be rapidly gaining in acceptance, may 
be a valuable additional safeguard of the patient’s interest in directing 
his medical care.”111 
B. The Patient Self-Determination Act 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In large part based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Cruzan, 
Congress passed the bipartisan Patient Self-Determination Act112 
(“PSDA”) in November 1990.113 Under the PSDA, any health care 
providers receiving Medicare or Medicaid payments must provide 
written information to patients regarding their rights under the law of 
the state in which the facility is located.114 This disclosure must include 
written information about the right “to make decisions concerning such 
medical care, including the right to accept or refuse medical or surgical 
treatment and the right to formulate advance directives.”115 It also must 
include written information about “the written policies of the provider 
or organization respecting the implementation of such rights.”116 
Importantly, this written information must be provided: 
(A) in the case of a hospital, at the time of the individual’s 
admission as an inpatient, 
 
 108. Id. at 290 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 109. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 110. Id. at 290–91 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 111. Id. at 291–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 112. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 §§ 4206, 4751, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1395cc(a)(1)(Q), (f), 1395mm(c)(8), 1396a(a)(57), (58), 1396a(w) (2012). 
 113. Justin Waddell, Dead Letters: Protecting the Intentions of a Living Will 
Declarant with a Dedicated Advocate, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 801, 806 (2012). 
 114. Richard E. Shugrue, The Patient Self-Determination Act, 26 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 751, 761–62 (1993). 
 115. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(i). 
 116. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(ii). 
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(B) in the case of a skilled nursing facility, at the time of the 
individual’s admission as a resident, 
(C) in the case of a home health agency, in advance of the 
individual coming under the care of the agency, [and] 
(D) in the case of a hospice program, at the time of initial 
receipt of hospice care by the individual from the 
program . . . .117 
After receiving this information, the patient can choose whether to 
execute an advance directive, which the PSDA defines as “a written 
instruction, such as a living will or durable power of attorney for health 
care, recognized under State law (whether statutory or as recognized by 
the courts of the State) and relating to the provision of such care when 
the individual is incapacitated.”118 The PSDA requires the health care 
facility “to document in a prominent part of the individual’s current 
medical record whether or not the individual has executed an advance 
directive.”119 
2. GOALS OF THE PSDA 
a. Pre-asserting rights before isolation 
Part of the reason for the passage of the PSDA was the recognition 
of the isolation that patients often face when admitted to health care 
facilities.120 This isolation is especially acute in cases where patients are 
faced with terminal illnesses and end-of-life decisions.121 Indeed, some 
have asserted that, “like soldiers and prisoners, they are . . . ‘captives’ 
of their disease, their physicians and hospital, and their enforced 
isolation.”122 Moreover, elderly patients are often “frail, seriously sick, 
and socially isolated from the outset of the provider/patient 
relationship.”123 In such cases: 
 
 117. § 1395cc(f)(2). 
 118. § 1395cc(f)(3). 
 119. § 1395cc(f)(1)(B). 
 120. See LAWRENCE P. ULRICH, THE PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT: 
MEETING THE CHALLENGES IN PATIENT CARE 104–05 (1999). See generally Elizabeth 
McCloskey, Between Isolation and Intrusion: The Patient Self-Determination Act, 19 L. 
MED. & HEALTH CARE 80 (1991). 
 121. D. Christian Addicott, Regulating Research on the Terminally Ill: A 
Proposal for Heightened Safeguards, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 479, 492 
(1999). 
 122. JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 1053 (1972). 
 123. Marshall B. Kapp, Malpractice Liability in Long-Term Care: A Changing 
Environment, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1235, 1238 (1991). 
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The patient may understandably see herself as a burden—as 
requiring the family to waste the resources to maintain her in 
a painful and virtually incommunicado condition—until the 
money, the pain, and the technology is cut off by someone 
who neither knows her, nor really cares for her, but cares 
only that the medicare check comes in payment.124 
By allowing a patient to pre-assert his health care rights, the PSDA 
empowers the patient to make important decisions “when the patient is 
healthy and before she ‘experiences the dislocation that often attends 
inpatient admission.’”125 At the same time, the PSDA does not seek to 
coerce a patient into making certain health care decisions. During the 
Senate debate on the PSDA, an American Bar Association spokesperson 
expressed concern “for the indigent, poorly educated and isolated 
individuals who could be vulnerable to facile execution of documents 
urged upon them by over-enthusiastic caretakers.”126 In response, the 
PSDA was written so that health care providers merely provide patients 
with information about advance directives, not the directives 
themselves.127 
b. Overcoming the secrecy of the physician-patient relationship 
The physician-patient relationship is traditionally shrouded in 
secrecy based upon a nexus of laws ensuring confidentiality.128 
Collectively, these laws “shield doctor-patient interactions from the 
scrutiny of the outside world, thereby ensuring that the doctor’s 
influence will go unmitigated and undetected.”129 Indeed, in the  
end-of-life context, “several commentators have concluded that the 
 
 124. Paul J. Zwier, Looking for a Nonlegal Process: Physician-Assisted Suicide 
and the Care Perspective, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 199, 223 (1996). 
 125. Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Maladaption of Miranda to Advance 
Directives: A Critique of the Implementation of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 9 
HEALTH MATRIX 139, 153 (1999) (quoting Susan M. Wolf et al., Sources of Concern 
About the Patient Self-Determination Act, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1666, 1667 (1991)).  
 126. Living Wills: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Medicare and Long-term 
Care of the S. Comm. on Fin., 101st Cong. 42 (1990) (statement of Charles P. 
Sabatino, Assistant Director, Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, American 
Bar Association). 
 127. See Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advanced 
Directives: A History and Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 32 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 249, 265 (1997). 
 128. Patrick M. Curran, Jr., Note, Regulating Death: Oregon’s Death with 
Dignity Act and the Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 86 GEO. L.J. 725, 740 
(1998). 
 129. Id. at 740–41. 
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privacy of this relationship renders effective regulation of  
[physician-assisted suicide] impossible.”130 
The PSDA addresses this issue in two meaningful ways. First, it 
ensures that, if end-of-life “disputes arise . . . patients or their  
decision-makers and physicians will have a summary of patients’ rights 
under state law to make life-sustaining medical treatment decisions.”131 
Second, it facilitates the execution of advance directives, ensuring that 
there will be a written record of their wishes that will be known and 
honored by health care providers.132 
c. Counteracting the unfamiliarity of health care facilities 
The PSDA recognizes that patients being admitted into health care 
facilities can become disoriented based upon the unfamiliarity of the 
new staff and surroundings confronting them.133 The unfamiliar 
surroundings facing a patient upon admission make a health care facility 
a difficult place for patients to decide to execute advance directives.134 
The PSDA, however, facilitates the execution of advance directives 
“when the patient is healthy and before she ‘experiences the dislocation 
that often attends inpatient admission.’”135 
d. Preventing coercion 
The PSDA was passed in large part to address the coercion that a 
patient can face when receiving medical care, especially in cases 
 
 130. Id. at 741; see also Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of 
Physician-Assisted Suicide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1996) (“If it is true, as it indubitably is, that ‘decisions about medical 
treatment are normally made in the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship,’ then an 
obvious question must be asked: how is it possible, or could it ever be possible, to 
monitor and regulate those decisions regarding PAS that occur within the ambit of that 
privacy?” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Franklin G. Miller et al., Regulating  
Physician-Assisted Death, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 119, 119 (1994))). 
 131. Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries at the End of Life: Mediating  
End-of-Life Treatment Disputes to Prevent Erosion of Physician-Patient Relationships, 
79 B.U. L. REV. 1091, 1126 (1999). 
 132. Charles P. Sabatino, National Advance Directives: One Attempt to Scale 
the Barriers, 1 NAELA J. 131, 135 (2005). 
 133. Marni J. Lerner, Note, State Natural Death Acts: Illusory Protection of 
Individuals’ Life-Sustaining Treatment Decisions, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 210 
n.180 (1992). 
 134. Tara Rayne Shewchuk, Completing Advance Directives for Health Care 
Decisions: Getting to Yes, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 703, 713–14 (1998). 
 135. Pope, supra note 125, at 153 (quoting Wolf et al., supra note 125,  
at 1667). 
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involving possible end-of-life care.136 Many have argued that the 
physician-patient relationship is “inherently coercive” because “the 
balance of power between doctor and patient is almost entirely  
one-sided.”137 Others have noted that the physician-patient relationship 
is rife with actual coercion because “physicians manipulate the consent 
process to obtain the result they desire by the tone and sequence in 
which they convey the risk information . . . .”138 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court itself has recognized that end-of-life situations are 
especially rife with the risk of coercion.139 Finally, coercion is a 
concern throughout the field of advance directives and not limited to 
fear of doctor or hospital staff coercion. Some mental health advocates 
fear that family members may coerce persons with mental illness into 
signing advance directives, consenting to treatment they do not want. 
On the other hand, mental health professionals fear that advocates will 
persuade the mentally ill to reject both needed and wanted prospective 
treatment.140 
The PSDA addresses these concerns by informing patients about 
their health care rights so that they can choose whether to execute 
documents like advance directives before their condition deteriorates 
and they are more susceptible to heightened pressures from a variety of 
sources.141 
e. Promoting autonomy 
The PSDA was primarily passed because of the belief that patients 
were unable to exercise autonomy in making health care decisions 
under the existing framework.142 Specifically, most patients “cannot 
exercise even a semblance of autonomy about where they will spend 
 
 136. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 127, at 267 (noting how one of the goals 
of the PSDA was to empower patients and alleviate concerns about coercion). 
 137. Curran, supra note 128, at 740. 
 138. Mark A. Hall, Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 
511, 570 n.178 (1997). 
 139. Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 732 (1997) (construing Cruzan 
v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990)). 
 140. Justine A. Dunlap, Mental Health Advance Directives: Having One’s 
Say?, 89 KY. L.J. 327, 374–75 (2000). 
 141. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 127, at 265; Ben Kusmin, Note, Swing 
Low, Sweet Chariot: Abandoning the Disinterested Witness Requirement for Advance 
Directives, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 93, 99 (2006); Ruth F. Maron, Note, Who Has a Will 
to Live?: Why State Requirements for Advance Directives Should be Uniform(ly 
Revised), 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 169, 193 (2011); Lester J. Perling, Comment, Health 
Care Advance Directives: Implications for Florida Mental Health Patients, 48 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 193, 226–27 (1993). 
 142. See, e.g., John F. Peppin, Physician Neutrality and Patient Autonomy in 
Advance Directive Decisions, 11 ISSUES L. & MED. 13, 15 (1995). 
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their final days because such decisions are often fraught with coercion 
and fiscal pressures.”143 Indeed, patient autonomy was the primary 
principle guiding the creation of the PSDA.144 
The PSDA was passed based on the recognition that informing 
patients of their health care rights after they have been admitted is often 
too late to allow them to effectively understand and assert those 
rights.145 By providing information at an earlier stage, the PSDA allows 
patients to engage in advance planning that “avoids the need for state 
coercion and incompetency adjudication with its accompanying labeling 
effects while preserving the individual’s sense of dignity and 
autonomy.”146 
The PSDA is directed more toward “the process of decisionmaking 
rather than the decision itself.”147 The intent behind the PSDA was “to 
give patients accurate and uniform information without creating undue 
anxiety or pressuring them to execute documents they either did not 
understand or genuinely want.”148 Because it requires health care 
providers to supply information concerning health care rights at an 
early stage, it ensures that patients are “allowed to make their own 
decisions about the use or nonuse of advance directives.”149 
3. MEDICAL MIRANDA 
The PSDA has frequently been described as “medical Miranda.”150 
Indeed, co-sponsor John C. Danforth introduced the PSDA as an act 
 
 143. Arthur L. Caplan, Commentary: Can the Case Manager Offer Placement 
in Good Conscience?, in ETHICAL CONFLICT IN THE MANAGEMENT OF HOME CARE: THE 
CASE MANAGER’S DILEMMA 133, 136 (Rosalie A. Kane & Arthur L. Caplan eds., 
1993); see also Pope, supra note 125, at 158. 
 144. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 127, at 257; William M. Sage, 
Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1705 n.9 (1999) (“For example, autonomy concerns led to the 
passage of the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) . . . .”). 
 145. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 127, at 264 (quoting an American 
Hospital Association representative who stated during the debate on the PSDA that 
“[a]s a practical matter in many cases when the patient arrives at the hospital it is too 
late really to effectively deal with the situation”). 
 146. Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the 
Implications for Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 6, 39 (1995). 
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 148. Larson & Eaton, supra note 127, at 267. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Pope, supra note 125, at 142; see also Fred H. Cate, Implementing the 
Education Mandate of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 7 HEALTH LAW., Fall 1993, 
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that would create “health care’s own Miranda warning.”151 The analogy 
makes sense because it requires medical providers to inform patients of 
their health care rights just like criminal Miranda obligates police 
officers to advise suspects of their right to counsel and their right to 
remain silent.152 
III. MIRANDA REVISITED 
A. Introduction 
In its dicta in McNeil, the Supreme Court expressed skepticism 
about extending the Edwards prophylaxis to cover pre-assertions of 
Miranda rights for two primary reasons. First, the Court noted that 
most rights cannot be asserted until “the government seeks to take the 
action they protect against.”153 Second, the Court feared that it could 
place no meaningful limitations on the pre-assertion of the Miranda 
right to counsel if it approved such pre-assertion.154 Instead, the 
Miranda right to counsel could be asserted “by a letter prior to arrest” 
or “prior to identification as a suspect,” with the police subsequently 
unable to interrogate the suspect in perpetuity.155 
This section addresses this dicta and makes four arguments in 
favor of extending the Edwards prophylaxis to cover pre-assertions of 
Miranda rights. Part B of this section argues that the same principles 
 
at 11, 13 (“How do we keep the Act from becoming what has already been called a 
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care facilities must provide patients with a written “medical Miranda” outlining their 
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informs patients about their basic rights to refuse treatment.”); Sloane, supra note 150. 
 153. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991). 
 154. Id. 
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supporting the pre-assertion of health care rights that led to the passage 
of the PSDA justify legal recognition of the pre-assertion of Miranda 
rights. Part C of this section contends that courts have already laid the 
framework for pre-assertion of Miranda rights in a way that allows for 
equitable and meaningful limitations to be placed on pre-assertion. Part 
D of this section asserts that the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in 
Maryland v. Shatzer156 quells concerns that authorizing pre-assertions 
would hinder police investigations in perpetuity. Finally, Part E of this 
section notes that the Supreme Court has recently created an important 
limitation on the principles at the heart of the Edwards prophylaxis that 
supports its extension to certain pre-assertions of Miranda rights. 
B. The Similar Justifications for Criminal and Medical Miranda 
1. ASSERTING RIGHTS BEFORE ISOLATION 
The Miranda opinion was based to a large extent on the fact that 
most custodial interrogations take place “in the isolated setting of the 
police station,” with the suspect being incommunicado, i.e., unable to 
communicate with others besides his interrogators.157 The Miranda 
Court began by noting that each of the cases before it involved 
“incommunicado interrogations of individuals in a police-dominated 
atmosphere . . . .”158 The Court observed that the largely 
incommunicado nature of most custodial interrogations keeps “what 
transpires at such interrogations” largely under wraps and also cited to 
a myriad of cases in which it previously uncovered police extortion of 
confessions via physical violence and “sustained and protracted 
questioning incommunicado . . . .”159 
Later, the Court focused on three prior cases in which it reversed 
convictions because police engaged in mental rather than physical 
coercion during custodial interrogation.160 With regard to these 
interrogations, the Court concluded that, “[i]n other settings, these 
individuals might have exercised their constitutional rights. In the 
incommunicado police-dominated atmosphere, they succumbed.”161 The 
Court later found a suspect’s inability to speak with others (or his lack 
of knowledge of that ability) inconsistent with the privilege against  
 
 156. 559 U.S. 98 (2010). 
 157. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966). 
 158. Id. at 445. 
 159. Id. at 445–46. 
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self-incrimination, noting that “[t]he current practice of incommunicado 
interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation’s most cherished 
principles—that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate 
himself.”162 
In terms of isolation, the Court pointed out that police manuals 
instruct officers “[t]o highlight the isolation and unfamiliar 
surroundings” of a stationhouse custodial interrogation.163 The Court 
thereafter determined that these practices are effective because, “[a]s a 
practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the 
police station may well be greater than in courts or other official 
investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard 
against intimidation or trickery.”164 Finally, the Court tied both the 
isolation and incommunicado strands of its analysis together, 
concluding that the government bears the heavy burden of proving 
subsequent waiver after a suspect who previously asserted his right to 
remain silent or right to an attorney subsequently waived that right.165 
From the Court’s perspective, “[s]ince the State is responsible for 
establishing the isolated circumstances under which the interrogation 
takes place and has the only means of making available corroborated 
evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the 
burden is rightly on its shoulders.”166 
In its subsequent opinion in United States v. Washington,167 the 
Court succinctly explained that “[a]ll Miranda’s safeguards, which are 
designed to avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the overbearing 
compulsion which the Court thought was caused by isolation of a 
suspect in police custody.”168 
2. OVERCOMING THE SECRECY OF THE 
POLICE OFFICER–SUSPECT RELATIONSHIP 
Because most suspects are incommunicado during isolated 
custodial interrogations at stationhouses, there is a privacy and secrecy 
that shrouds the process. The Miranda Court observed that 
“[i]nterrogation still takes place in privacy.”169 According to the Court, 
this “[p]rivacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our 
 
 162. Id. at 457–58. 
 163. Id. at 450. 
 164. Id. at 461. 
 165. Id. at 475. 
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 167. 431 U.S. 181 (1977). 
 168. Id. at 187 n.5. 
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knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms.”170 
The Court again referenced police manuals, which inform officers “that 
the ‘principal psychological factor contributing to a successful 
interrogation is privacy—being alone with the person under 
interrogation.’”171 The privacy and secrecy of the process led the Court 
to conclude that preliminary advice by an attorney is insufficient; 
instead, upon request, counsel must be present throughout a custodial 
interrogation because “[e]ven preliminary advice given to the accused 
by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation 
process.”172 
According to at least one source, “[t]he Miranda Court’s greatest 
concern was the inherent coercion in incommunicado interrogation that 
arises from the privacy and secrecy of” custodial interrogations.173 
3. COUNTERACTING THE UNFAMILIARITY OF THE STATIONHOUSE 
While officers are required to give the Miranda warning whenever 
and wherever they subject suspects to custodial interrogation, the 
Miranda Court’s opinion was born out of four cases in which police 
conducted interrogations within the four walls of the stationhouse. 
According to the Court, in each of the cases before it, “the defendant 
was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing 
police interrogation procedures.”174 As previously noted, the Miranda 
Court cited to police manuals, which instructed officers “[t]o highlight 
the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings” of a stationhouse custodial 
interrogation.175 The Court then went on to explain that 
 If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in 
the investigator’s office or at least in a room of his own 
choice. The subject should be deprived of every psychological 
advantage. In his own home he may be confident, indignant, 
or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and 
more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions of criminal behavior 
within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and other 
friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In 
his office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The 
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atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces of the 
law.176 
As the Supreme Court later noted in Minnesota v. Murphy,177 
“[m]any of the psychological ploys discussed in Miranda capitalize on 
the suspect’s unfamiliarity with the officers and the environment.”178 
4. PREVENTING COERCION 
Given the aura of invincibility surrounding “the forces of the law,” 
it is unsurprising that the Miranda Court deemed custodial 
interrogations inherently coercive. The Court deemed the Miranda 
warning necessary “to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial 
surroundings . . . .”179 Later, the Court found that custodial 
interrogation without the Miranda warning “contains inherently 
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to 
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so 
freely.”180 The Court then restated this conclusion even more 
forcefully, finding that the Miranda warning is “an absolute 
prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation 
atmosphere.”181 The Miranda dissent put it the most concisely, 
characterizing the majority’s position as declaring that “in-custody 
interrogation is inherently coercive,”182 a characterization that the Court 
has often repeated.183 
The Court’s conclusion in Miranda rested not merely on the 
coercion inherent in custodial interrogation but also on the actual 
coercive techniques that law enforcement officials are taught to apply 
while questioning suspects. As noted, some of these techniques involve 
isolating the suspect within the four walls of the stationhouse and 
making sure that the interrogation is conducted incommunicado.184 The 
Court also cited to police manuals instructing officers “to display an air 
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of confidence in the suspect’s guilt and from outward appearance to 
maintain only an interest in confirming certain details.”185 Additionally, 
the Court referenced the recommendation that police officers team up to 
interrogate suspects, using the classic “good cop, bad cop” 
technique.186 The Court then later concluded: 
 From these representative samples of interrogation 
techniques, the setting prescribed by the manuals and 
observed in practice becomes clear. In essence, it is this: To 
be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and 
to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence 
in his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms 
the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe. 
Patience and persistence, at times relentless questioning, are 
employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator must 
“patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a position from 
which the desired objective may be attained.”187 
5. PROMOTING FREE CHOICE/AUTONOMY 
In the end, the Miranda Court combined all of the above factors to 
get to the heart of the issue: Law enforcement officers must not conduct 
custodial interrogations in a manner that runs afoul of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.188 And, according to 
the Court, a custodial interrogation only complies with the Fifth 
Amendment privilege if the interrogating officer apprises the suspect of 
his right to remain silent as well as his right to an attorney and secures 
a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of those rights.189 
The purpose, then, of the Miranda warning is to ensure that the 
statements that a suspect makes in response to custodial interrogation 
are the result of a free and rational waiver of his constitutional rights. 
This is a theme that the Miranda majority repeated throughout its 
opinion. The Court found none of the four convictions under review to 
be constitutionally viable because “in none of these cases did the 
officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the 
interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free 
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choice.”190 This lack of appropriate safeguards meant that each 
defendant was put “in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity 
for rational judgment.”191 
The Court then found that these concerns were not unique to the 
cases before it but instead would apply to any custodial interrogation: 
“Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the 
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained 
from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.”192 
Therefore, “whatever the background of the person interrogated, a 
warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its 
pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise 
the privilege at that point in time.”193 Moreover, a suspect must 
thereafter be able to invoke his right to remain silent and his right to an 
attorney “at any time prior to or during questioning” because, 
“[w]ithout the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody 
interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in 
producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.”194 
As the Southern District of New York later explained in United 
States v. Dosanjh,195 Miranda requires “that the autonomy of the 
individual not be intimidated, or coerced, or compromised by 
ignorance.”196 
6. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF MIRANDA 
Studies conducted over the course of more than four decades have 
consistently found that around eighty percent of adults waive their 
Miranda rights.197 Three decades of research also supports the empirical 
finding that more than ninety percent of juveniles waive their Miranda 
rights.198 
Many have claimed that the Miranda warning is ineffective 
because it “come[s] too late to impose significant constraints on the 
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acquisition of evidence from the accused.”199 The Miranda warning is 
likely ineffective in large part because it primarily governs custodial 
interrogations conducted by detectives, “a small elite in the police force 
who can become trained and experienced in minimizing the effect of 
Miranda or even using it to their strategic advantage.”200 These 
detectives often “give[] considerable thought about how to use such 
warnings to their strategic advantage.”201 For instance, some detectives 
“preface[] the warnings with an explanation that they were part of the 
police’s good-faith attempt to hear the suspect’s side of the story before 
deciding whether to bring charges.”202 As a result, when suspects 
realize they have said too much, “it [i]s almost always too late.”203 
While many have dubbed the PSDA “medical Miranda,”204 the Act 
is actually much more efficacious than its criminal counterpart because 
it allows patients to assert their health care rights before admission. 
Conversely, criminal suspects cannot assert their Miranda rights until 
they are subjected to the very process that the Supreme Court has 
deemed inherently coercive.205 
7. PRE-ASSERTION OF RIGHTS BEFORE GOVERNMENTAL ACTION 
In McNeil, the Court noted that most rights cannot be asserted until 
“the government seeks to take the action they protect against.”206 To the 
extent that this statement is true,207 this thinking probably makes sense 
for most rights. For instance, why would a citizen need to assert his 
Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment before 
the government seeks to sentence him to the death penalty, life 
imprisonment, or some other harsh criminal penalty? Similarly, why 
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would a citizen need to assert his Seventh Amendment right to a trial by 
jury before the government charges him with violating a criminal law? 
In either of these cases, it would be nonsensical for the citizen to  
pre-assert his rights, and no coercive force would prevent him from 
asserting his rights after the government sought to act. 
Conversely, both health care and Miranda rights seem to fall into a 
different category based upon the unique circumstances surrounding 
their assertion. As previously noted, several sources have recognized 
the difficulty that both patients and suspects face in asserting their 
rights due to factors such as isolation and coercion. Therefore, it makes 
sense for both patients and suspects to be able to pre-assert their rights 
because the future versions of themselves might not be able to assert 
these rights.208 
In similar contexts, legislatures have passed laws based upon 
exactly this type of thinking. One example of this type of law is a 
mandatory arrest law, which requires police officers responding to 911 
calls to arrest suspects if they have probable cause to believe that they 
committed acts of domestic violence, regardless of whether the alleged 
victim consents to the arrest.209 Currently, approximately twenty-two 
states have some version of a mandatory arrest law, and many 
prosecutors’ offices also have no-drop policies, which “require 
prosecution of a domestic violence perpetrator, regardless of the 
victim’s wishes . . . .”210 
The rationale for these laws and policies are the same as the 
rationale for the PSDA: when isolated with her abuser before his arrest 
and prosecution, a domestic violence victim might be coerced into not 
pressing charges or pursuing the case to trial.211 While many argue that 
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these laws and policies infringe upon the victim’s autonomy,212 others 
claim that they promote the autonomy and empowerment of the victim 
by honoring the choice that she made to call 911 rather than her 
subsequent decision to drop the case after potentially being subjected to 
isolation and coercion.213 
These same rationales similarly support the idea that the Edwards 
prophylaxis should be extended to allow suspects to pre-assert their 
Miranda rights. In Miranda, the Court found the Miranda warning to 
be constitutionally mandated to ensure that suspects either assert their 
rights or execute a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of those 
rights.214 But, as used to be the case with domestic violence victims as 
well as patients, especially those suffering from potentially terminal 
illnesses, there is a real danger that their ultimate decisions will be 
involuntary based upon a combination of factors such as isolation and 
coercion.215 
C. Applying the Existing Miranda Framework to Allow 
for Pre-Assertion 
1. INVOCATION OF MIRANDA RIGHTS WHEN INTERROGATION  
IS “IMMINENT” 
Assuming that courts accept the general theory that the Edwards 
prophylaxis should be extended to cover some pre-assertions of 
Miranda rights, there is a remaining question over where to draw the 
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line. In McNeil, the Court expressed concern that authorizing  
pre-assertion of the Miranda rights could lead to their assertion “by a 
letter prior to arrest” or “prior to identification as a suspect.”216 The 
possibility of such a slippery slope could be reason not to authorize  
pre-assertion because it could “unduly hamper[] the gathering of 
information.”217 
It appears, however, that a mechanism is already in place for 
courts to approve of a more incremental extension of the Edwards 
prophylaxis to cover only certain pre-assertions. As noted, courts 
across the country have used the McNeil dicta to conclude that Miranda 
rights cannot be invoked “in a context other than ‘custodial 
interrogation.’”218 That said, both federal219 and state courts220 across 
the country have held that individuals can assert their Miranda rights 
either during custodial interrogation or “when an interrogation is 
imminent.”221 In other words, many courts have concluded that  
pre-assertion of the Miranda rights when interrogation is “imminent” is 
an assertion made in the context of custodial interrogation.222 
Despite this language, however, courts have applied an extremely 
narrow construction to the word “imminent,” which has only allowed 
suspects to invoke their Miranda rights “in response to or just before 
interrogation.”223 For instance, in Hoerauf v. State,224 the defendant 
asked to speak to an attorney both while he was being fingerprinted 
during booking and while being placed in a holding cell hours before 
being taken to an interrogation room.225 Eventually, the defendant was 
taken to the interrogation room, waived his Miranda rights, and 
confessed.226 In finding that the trial court properly denied the 
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defendant’s motion to suppress, the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland cited its prior opinion in Marr v. State,227 which in turn cited 
five federal courts in support of the proposition that Miranda rights can 
be asserted during actual or imminent custodial interrogation.228 The 
court, however, concluded that the defendant did not invoke his right to 
counsel when custodial interrogation was imminent; instead, “all such 
requests were made by appellant prior to being placed in the 
interrogation room and questioned by Detective Sofelkanik.”229 
Similarly, in Pardon v. State,230 Raymond Pardon asked to speak 
to an attorney after he was arrested and being booked into detention on 
the same charge that would lead to his custodial interrogation.231 The 
District Court of Appeal of Florida held that he had not validly invoked 
his right to counsel because the interrogation of Pardon was not 
imminent.232 He was merely being booked into detention, albeit on the 
same charge on which he was later questioned.233 Questioning did not 
occur until a few hours later.234 Any request for an attorney at this point 
was an anticipatory invocation of his Miranda rights, which would not 
prevent the officers from later reading him his rights preparatory to 
interrogation.235 
Indeed, in applying a limited construction to the word “imminent,” 
the Third Circuit in Alston v. Redmond236 was only able to find two 
cases applying a somewhat broader construction of the word.237 Even 
these cases, however, did not apply expansive definitions of the word 
“imminent.” 
In United States v. Kelsey,238 Joseph Kelsey asked to see his 
attorney three or four times after being arrested in his home.239 The 
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police, however, “did not question Kelsey at this point and did not read 
him his Miranda warnings until much later.”240 Later, Kelsey was read 
the Miranda warning at his home, waived his Miranda rights, and 
confessed.241 The Tenth Circuit honored Kelsey’s pre-assertion of his 
Miranda rights, concluding that Kelsey was in “precisely the type of 
coercive atmosphere that generates the need for application of the 
Edwards rule” when he was arrested in his home.242 
In State v. Torres,243 the defendant was arrested for murdering her 
husband.244 She was subsequently detained in the conference room of 
the Sheriff’s Department from 7:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., whereupon she 
was taken to the sheriff’s office and told that she would be questioned 
shortly.245 The defendant asked to speak to counsel twice while in the 
conference room and once when taken to the sheriff’s office.246 When 
she was eventually questioned at 10:35 p.m., however, she waived her 
Miranda rights and confessed.247 The Supreme Court of North Carolina 
found that the defendant had validly invoked her Miranda right because 
“[i]t would make little sense to require a defendant already in custody 
to wait until the onset of questioning or the recitation of her Miranda 
rights before being permitted to invoke her right to counsel.”248 
While most courts have narrowly construed the term “imminent,” 
at least one court has applied a more expansive construction. In State v. 
Hambly,249 Detectives Rindt and Clausing approached Scott Hambly “in 
a parking lot outside his apartment and attempted to convince him to 
speak to them without their taking him into custody.”250 In response, 
Hambly repeatedly refused to speak, prompting Detective Rindt to 
place him under arrest.251 As Rindt shepherded Hambly to his squad 
car, Hambly “said that he wanted to speak to an attorney.”252 Rindt 
responded by placing Hambly “in the back of the car and told him that 
he could call an attorney once they arrived at the Washington County 
Jail.”253 Later, Hambly was read the Miranda warning, waived his 
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Miranda rights, and made a confession.254 The trial court eventually 
denied Hambly’s motion to suppress his confession, and Hambly was 
ultimately convicted of delivery of cocaine.255 
In addressing Hambly’s subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin concluded that a suspect can assert his Miranda rights when 
custodial interrogation is “imminent or impending.”256 In finding that 
Hambly asserted his Miranda right to counsel when interrogation was 
imminent or impending, the court used the following reasoning: 
In the minutes leading up to the defendant’s request for 
counsel, Detective Rindt made it clear that he intended to 
question the defendant. The defendant could have reasonably 
surmised that because Rindt was persistent in wanting to 
interrogate him, Rindt would continue to attempt to 
interrogate him in a custodial setting after he refused to speak 
with Rindt in a noncustodial setting. The defendant had no 
reason to believe that Rindt’s eagerness to question him 
dissipated once Rindt took him into custody.257 
Hambly thus shows how most courts could easily apply the 
existing Miranda framework to allow for pre-assertions of Miranda 
rights by simply applying a broader definition of the word “imminent.” 
That said, the court’s opinion in Hambly was anything but easy. The 
court floated but rejected the possibility that a suspect should be able to 
assert his Miranda rights “any time the suspect is in custody, even 
before Miranda warnings or the onset of questioning.”258 The court also 
surveyed every case which had found that a suspect could invoke his 
Miranda rights when custodial interrogation was imminent but 
determined that none of these cases actually set forth a standard for 
defining imminence.259 Ultimately, the court concluded “that an 
interrogation is impending or imminent if a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s position would have believed that interrogation was 
imminent or impending.”260 
Hambly therefore illustrates another reason why courts could 
refuse to extend the Edwards prophylaxis to pre-assertions of Miranda 
rights. Currently, according to nearly all courts, suspects can only 
assert their Miranda rights during or just before custodial interrogation, 
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which is the same point in time when the police must administer the 
Miranda warning. The argument could thus be made that allowing 
suspects to pre-assert their Miranda rights would require courts to 
create a second test that is different from the test for determining when 
officers must administer the Miranda warning. Such an argument, 
however, would be misguided because courts can determine whether a 
suspect can pre-assert his Miranda rights by using the same test that 
they already apply for deciding whether an officer can pre-administer 
the Miranda warning. 
2. THE ABILITY OF OFFICERS TO PRE-ADMINISTER THE  
MIRANDA WARNING 
A year after the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided Hambly, it 
handed down its decision in State v. Grady.261 In Grady, Marchand 
Grady voluntarily went to the police station to discuss the murder of 
Allen Jemison.262 Upon arrival at 8:16 p.m., Grady was indisputably 
not in custody when Detective Corbett began questioning him about the 
murder; nonetheless, “Detective Corbett began the interview by 
administering Miranda warnings to Grady so as to be ‘better safe than 
sorry,’ and Grady indicated that he understood the rights he was 
read.”263 
At 10:45 p.m., another suspect being questioned separately said 
that Grady killed Jemison, resulting in Grady being placed under 
arrest.264 At this point, “Miranda warnings were not readministered to 
Grady,” who made several inculpatory statements.265 Before trial, 
Grady moved to suppress his post-arrest statements, but the court 
denied his motion, and he was ultimately convicted of murder.266 
On appeal, Grady asked the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to adopt 
a “bright-line rule,” pursuant to which “any and all Miranda warnings 
prior to custody [are] ipso facto ineffective.”267 The court declined to 
adopt this bright-line rule and instead applied the totality of the 
circumstances test utilized by “the overwhelming majority of other 
courts who have considered this question.”268 Under this test, courts 
determine whether the pre-administration of the Miranda warning 
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before custody and the failure to re-administer the warning immediately 
before custodial interrogation is unconstitutional by looking at multiple 
factors,  
including whether the same officer or officers conducted the 
questioning, whether the location changed, whether the 
subject matter of the questioning was consistent, whether a 
reminder of the Miranda rights was given before the custodial 
interrogation began, whether the suspect was mentally or 
emotionally impaired, whether more coercive tactics were 
used when the suspect was placed in custody, the suspect’s 
past experience with law enforcement, and how much time 
elapsed between the administration of the Miranda warnings 
and the custodial interrogation or confession.269 
In its opinion, the Grady court cited to a laundry list of opinions 
from courts around the country, each of which found that the  
pre-administration of the Miranda warning hours before custodial 
interrogation was constitutional, even when the warning was not  
re-administered immediately before custodial interrogation.270 The court 
then agreed with this analysis, noting that the goal of Miranda is “to 
inform the suspect that the interrogators will recognize his or her rights 
if exercised” and “ensure that a confession is free and 
unconstrained.”271 According to the court,  
 Given this purpose, a rule that assumes a suspect is a 
blank slate with no awareness of his or her rights as soon as 
he or she is placed in custody is a head-in-the-sand approach. 
In addition, application of Grady’s bright-line rule would 
focus the analysis on the custody status of a suspect rather 
than on the individual’s comprehension and waiver of his 
rights. It is, in short, form over substance. A rule that says 
warnings given one minute before custody are ineffective per 
se because they were not given when the suspect was actually 
in custody is manifestly unreasonable.272 
In addition to finding that a bright-line rule against  
pre-administration betrayed Miranda’s primary purpose, the court 
concluded that  
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beyond its lack of fidelity to the purposes and principles 
behind Miranda, Grady’s approach is unworkable. One of its 
major flaws is that it assumes that the precise point of custody 
is fixed and known at the time of questioning. While this may 
sometimes be the case, it is not always true. In practice, it is 
not always clear when a suspect is officially under arrest.273 
These lines of analysis by the court were eminently reasonable and 
similar to the analysis conducted by other courts on the issue.274 
Conversely, this analysis lays bare the unreasonableness of courts 
failing to allow suspects to pre-assert their Miranda rights. If courts are 
unwilling to treat suspects like a blank slate at the start of custodial 
interrogation, why do they treat pre-assertions of Miranda rights as if 
they were written on Etch-a-Sketches simply because they were made 
before the technical definition of custodial interrogation? If the lack of 
clarity over when a suspect is technically in custody justifies allowing 
officers to pre-administer the Miranda warning, why are suspects, who 
have much less familiarity with the legal definition of custody, not 
similarly able to pre-assert their Miranda rights? 
This Article thus proposes a test based on reciprocity and 
equanimity: Suspects should be allowed to pre-assert their Miranda 
rights under the same circumstances that officers are allowed to  
pre-administer the Miranda warning. In other words, if the totality of 
the circumstances supports a finding that an officer could  
pre-administer the Miranda warning, the same totality of the 
circumstances should support a finding that the suspect could pre-assert 
his Miranda rights. 
For example, consider the outcomes in the following two cases: 
First, in People v. Petrone,275 Officer Roy Rodriguez responded to a 
911 call regarding a robbery of money and jewelry at the house of 
Hazel Hudson.276 Later, about a mile and a half away from Hudson’s 
house, Officer Rodriguez pulled over a car driven by John Petrone.277 
Petrone consented to a search of his vehicle, which led to Officer 
Rodriguez discovering jewelry and $600 in cash.278 Officer Rodriguez 
did not arrest Petrone but did read him the Miranda warning and asked 
him about the jewelry.279 Petrone responded that the jewelry belonged 
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to his mother and was in his car because he was in the process of 
moving and did not want it to get stolen.280 
Officer Rodriguez then arrested Petrone and took him to the police 
station, where he subjected him to a custodial interrogation one hour 
and fifteen minutes later; Rodriguez never re-administered the Miranda 
warning.281 In finding no issue with the trial court’s denial of Petrone’s 
motion to suppress the statement he made during custodial 
interrogation, the appellate court applied the totality of the 
circumstances test.282 According to the court, “the effectiveness of 
appellant’s initial waiver was not reduced by the one hour and fifteen 
minutes between when appellant was first Mirandized and when he was 
subsequently interrogated at the police station.”283 
Second, in United States v. Stanley,284 Trooper Jay Poppe pulled 
over Leon Stanley for speeding.285 While conducting the traffic stop, 
Trooper Poppe noted some irregularities, such as the fact that Stanley’s 
rental car had aftermarket tires and wheels.286 After being questioned 
about the nature of his trip, Stanley responded, “[T]his is all because of 
what happened in Missouri, isn’t it?”287 When Trooper Poppe asked 
about Missouri, Stanley responded that he had been arrested with 
fourteen pounds of marijuana.288 Trooper Poppe asked for consent to 
search Stanley’s vehicle, but Stanley refused to give consent.289 
Trooper Poppe then told Stanley that he believed he was engaged 
in criminal activity and that he was detaining him pending the arrival of 
a narcotics-detection dog.290 Stanley demanded to speak to an attorney 
on several occasions, but Trooper Poppe answered that Stanley did not 
have any right to counsel because he was merely being detained, not 
arrested.291 About half an hour later, the dog arrived and alerted to the 
trunk, leading to discovery of a gun but no drugs.292 
At this point, Poppe placed Stanley under arrest and read him the 
Miranda warning.293 Stanley responded “that he had already requested, 
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and been denied, a lawyer.”294 Trooper Poppe responded that “he was 
denied a lawyer while being detained, but now he is now under 
arrest.”295 Stanley waived his Miranda rights and later made 
incriminatory statements when interrogated in an interview room at 
traffic headquarters.296 The court later denied Stanley’s motion to 
suppress his statements, citing McNeil’s dicta about suspects not being 
able to invoke their Miranda rights anticipatorily in a context other than 
custodial interrogation.297 
Given the factual similarity between Petrone and Stanley, it seems 
clear that the court would have had no problem with Trooper Poppe  
pre-administering the Miranda warning after calling for the  
narcotics-detection dog and failing to re-administer the Miranda 
warning before engaging in subsequent custodial interrogation. 
Therefore, the same dispensation should have been given to Stanley, 
allowing him to pre-assert his Miranda rights at the same point in time. 
The same analysis could also be done in other contexts. For 
instance, courts have found that officers can pre-administer the 
Miranda warning while asking suspects for consent to search.298 
Therefore, despite current precedent to the contrary,299 courts should 
find that suspects can pre-assert their Miranda rights when being asked 
to consent to searches. Because courts have allowed officers to  
pre-administer the Miranda warning before suspects take polygraph 
examinations,300 suspects should be able to pre-assert their Miranda 
rights at this same time, even if the Miranda warning is not given in 
connection with polygraph testing.301 
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Such a reciprocal test is not merely rooted in fairness; it also 
means that courts would not have to create any new test for dealing 
with pre-assertions of Miranda rights, conserving judicial resources. 
D. The Limited Duration of Miranda Rights 
Prior to 2010, critics of expanding the Edwards prophylaxis to 
cover pre-assertions could claim that it would hinder police 
investigations because it would prevent officers from being able to 
interrogate suspects in perpetuity. First, such a criticism would not be 
entirely accurate because an officer could still interrogate such a 
suspect once he was given counsel or if the suspect himself reinitiated 
communications with the officer.302 Indeed, in the aforementioned 
Hambly case, in which the suspect pre-asserted his Miranda rights, the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin found no constitutional violation because 
the suspect himself initiated further communications.303 
Second, this criticism is no longer accurate at all after the Supreme 
Court’s 2010 opinion in Maryland v. Shatzer. In Shatzer, Michael 
Shatzer was in prison for an unrelated crime when he was approached 
by a detective about allegations he had abused his son before being 
incarcerated.304 Thinking he was being questioned about the unrelated 
crime, Shatzer initially waived his Miranda rights but later refused to 
speak to the detective without an attorney upon realizing he was being 
asked about abusing his son.305 The detective immediately ceased 
questioning Shatzer.306 Two and a half years later, another detective 
approached Shatzer about the allegations he had abused his son.307 At 
this point, Shatzer waived his Miranda rights, failed a polygraph test, 
and eventually confessed to the crime.308 
Shatzer later moved to suppress his confession, claiming that the 
Edwards prophylaxis precluded the detective from interrogating him 
once he had invoked his Miranda right to counsel.309 The trial court 
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denied Shatzer’s motion to suppress, and the Supreme Court eventually 
agreed with this decision.310 First, the Supreme Court held that a return 
to the general prison population was a break in “custody,” at least for 
Miranda purposes.311 Second, the court held that a break in custody of 
at least fourteen days renders the Edwards prophylaxis inapplicable; in 
other words, if an officer approaches a suspect at least fourteen days 
after he has validly asserted his Miranda right to counsel, the suspect’s 
statements are not presumed to be involuntary.312 
E. The Edwards Prophylaxis Should Be Extended to  
Cover Pre-Assertions 
Ultimately, courts deciding whether to expand the Edwards 
prophylaxis to cover certain pre-assertions of Miranda rights must 
determine whether the benefits of extension outweigh the costs.313 The 
primary benefit of the Edwards prophylaxis is that it acts to 
“‘[p]reserv[e] the integrity of an accused’s choice to communicate with 
police only through counsel’ by ‘prevent[ing] police from badgering 
[him] into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.’”314 Its 
secondary benefit is “conserv[ing] judicial resources which would 
otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations of 
voluntariness.”315 Conversely, the costs of the Edwards prophylaxis are 
“the in-fact voluntary confessions it excludes from trial, and the 
voluntary confessions it deters law enforcement officers from even 
trying to obtain.”316 Simply put, courts must determine whether the 
number of coerced confessions an expanded Edwards prophylaxis 
would exclude justify the number of voluntary confessions the expanded 
prophylaxis would prevent.317 
In Shatzer, the Court refused to extend the Edwards prophylaxis 
because it concluded that the interrogation at issue did not implicate the 
“concer[n] that motivated the Edwards line of cases”318: “that the 
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suspect will be coerced into saying yes.”319 Instead, the Court 
concluded that “there is no reason to believe a suspect will view 
confession as ‘the only way to end his interrogation’ when, before the 
interrogation begins, he is told that he can avoid it by simply requesting 
that he not be interrogated without counsel present—an option that 
worked before.”320 
Conversely, in cases in which suspects seek to pre-assert their 
Miranda rights, their attempts are rebuffed. Indeed, such suspects are 
often flatly told that they cannot assert their rights.321 Therefore, when 
they are later read the Miranda warning, there is a significant reason to 
believe that they will view confessions as the only way to end their 
interrogations. 
In Davis v. United States,322 the Supreme Court found that a 
suspect’s Miranda rights were not violated because the suspect failed to 
unequivocally assert them.323 That said, in their opinion concurring in 
the judgment, four Justices partially analogized the case before them to 
the pre-Miranda opinion in Escobedo v. Illinois,324 in which the 
Supreme Court deemed a confession involuntary in large part due to the 
fact that the suspect’s preliminary request to speak to an attorney was 
denied.325 According to the concurring Justices in Davis, “[w]hen a 
suspect understands his (expressed) wishes to have been ignored . . . , 
he may well see further objection as futile and confession (true or not) 
as the only way to end his interrogation.”326 
In McNeil, the Supreme Court did not deny that allowing suspects 
to pre-assert their Miranda rights would preserve the integrity of the 
accused’s choice. Instead, it merely worried that extending the Edwards 
prophylaxis would not conserve judicial resources because it would be 
impossible to place meaningful limitations on the ability of suspects to 
pre-assert their Miranda rights.327 
This Article, however, has set forth a test that allows courts to put 
meaningful limitations on both the front and back end of the process. 
On the back end, the Court’s recent opinion in Shatzer means that 
officers can interrogate a suspect fourteen days after pre-assertion of 
the Miranda right to counsel and even earlier if the suspect re-initiates 
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communications or is appointed an attorney.328 Meanwhile, if a suspect 
pre-asserts his right to silence, officers must merely “scrupulously 
honor” that right.329 
On the front end, courts can conserve judicial resources by 
determining whether suspects can pre-assert their Miranda rights by 
applying the same totality-of-the-circumstances test that they use for 
deciding whether officers can pre-administer the Miranda warning.330 
Under this test, suspects can only pre-assert their Miranda rights when 
custodial interrogation is “imminent,”331 quelling the McNeil Court’s 
concern about suspects being able to pre-assert their rights at any point 
in time. 
Most importantly, the pre-assertion scenario is the opposite of the 
scenario the Court confronted in Shatzer. Usually, the Court is 
skeptical about a suspect’s decision to speak with authorities after 
initially invoking his Miranda rights.332 In Shatzer, the Court was able 
to overcome this skepticism based on the belief that a suspect who 
successfully asserted his right to counsel would believe he could make 
the same choice if officers waited at least fourteen days before 
approaching him again.333 
In the pre-assertion context, however, a suspect’s initial attempt to 
assert his Miranda rights is (currently) rejected. Sometimes, this 
rejection consists of the officer saying that the suspect cannot invoke his 
Miranda rights;334 other times, this rejection consists of the suspect 
immediately being placed under arrest.335 Given these circumstances, 
there is little reason to believe that the suspect will think that he can 
avoid custodial interrogation by asserting his Miranda rights given that 
his prior attempt at assertion did not work. 
There is also little reason to believe that a suspect’s decision to 
waive his Miranda rights after pre-assertion is the result of anything 
other than the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation. In 
Shatzer, the Court found that officers could reapproach a suspect 
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fourteen days after he initially asserted his Miranda right to counsel by 
using the following reasoning: 
 When . . . a suspect has been released from his pretrial 
custody and has returned to his normal life for some time 
before the later attempted interrogation, there is little reason 
to think that his change of heart regarding interrogation 
without counsel has been coerced. He has no longer been 
isolated. He has likely been able to seek advice from an 
attorney, family members, and friends. And he knows from 
his earlier experience that he need only demand counsel to 
bring the interrogation to a halt. . . . His change of heart is 
less likely attributable to “badgering” than it is to the fact that 
further deliberation in familiar surroundings has caused him 
to believe (rightly or wrongly) that cooperating with the 
investigation is in his interest. Uncritical extension of 
Edwards to this situation would not significantly increase the 
number of genuinely coerced confessions excluded. The 
“justification for a conclusive presumption disappears when 
application of the presumption will not reach the correct result 
most of the time.”336 
In pre-assertion cases covered by the test proposed in this Article, 
none of these factors are present. The “earlier experience” of suspects 
in these cases is unsuccessful assertion of Miranda rights, which might 
make them believe subsequent attempts at assertion would be futile. 
Given that suspects would only be allowed to pre-assert their Miranda 
rights when custodial interrogation is “imminent,” these suspects are 
not able to return to their normal lives for any period of time. 
Therefore, there is no reason to believe that they had a change of heart 
regarding waiver and every reason to believe that their confessions are 
simply the product of a process that the Supreme Court has deemed 
“inherently coercive.”337 Accordingly, legal acknowledgment of  
pre-assertions of Miranda rights will likely lead to the correct result 
most of the time. 
CONCLUSION 
In its opinion in Miranda, the Supreme Court required officers to 
give what is now known as the Miranda warning so that suspects would 
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have a “full opportunity” and a “continuous opportunity” to exercise 
their Fifth Amendment rights.338 Decades of empirical data, however, 
reveal that this opportunity is illusory, with around eighty percent of 
suspects waiving their Miranda rights.339 This Article has identified the 
likely reason for this under-assertion: the inability of suspects to  
pre-assert their Miranda rights until they are subjected to the very 
process that the Supreme Court has described as “inherently 
coercive.”340 
The unwillingness of courts to honor pre-assertions of Miranda 
rights can be traced back to dicta from the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
McNeil. The McNeil Court cautioned against crediting pre-assertions 
because most rights cannot be anticipatorily asserted and because 
meaningful limitations could not be placed upon the right to pre-assert. 
This Article has identified the PSDA, the so-called “medical Miranda,” 
as a useful analogue that demonstrates how allowing pre-assertion of 
certain rights can bolster autonomy and counteract the effects of 
coercion and isolation. Given the comparisons between the  
physician-patient and officer-suspect relationships, the same principles 
that support the pre-assertion of medical Miranda rights also support 
the pre-assertion of criminal Miranda rights. Moreover, the framework 
is already in place for courts to credit such pre-assertions in an 
equitable way that will not strain judicial resources. 
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